Everett's interpretation of quantum mechanics was proposed to avoid problems inherent in the prevailing interpretational frame. It assumes that quantum mechanics can be applied to any system and that the state vector always evolves unitarily. It then claims that whenever an observable is measured, all possible results of the measurement exist. This assertion of multiplicity has been understood in many ways by proponents of Everett's theory. Here we shall illustrate how different views on multiplicity carry onto different views on spacetime.
Introduction
Everett's interpretation of quantum mechanics [1, 2] was proposed in a context where challenges to quantum interpretational orthodoxy were not well received [3] . At the time, the prevailing view drew both from the Copenhagen distinction between the quantum and the classical and from the Dirac-von Neumann collapse of the state vector.
Everett's framework attempts to do away with the collapse of the state vector, and to correct for a number of unsatisfactory aspects of the Copenhagen interpretation. The latter requires, in particular, a classical world logically prior to the quantum world, as well as observers outside quantum systems under investigation. In contradistinction to this, Everett's framework incorporates the following characteristics:
2 Three problems in Everett's approach
Probability
The probability problem in Everett's approach is twofold. The first horn of the problem concerns determinism, the second one has to do with numerical values.
As indicated above, according to Everett the state vector always evolves unitarily, in accordance with the Schrödinger equation. So the question is, How can probability arise if evolution is completely deterministic? The answer given by Everettians is that probability is not objective. Rather, it represents an observer's subjective uncertainty as to his post-measurement situation.
In quantum mechanics, numerical values of probability are given by the Born rule. Everett claimed that the Born rule does not need to be separately postulated, but can be derived naturally from the quantum formalism. The derivation turned out to be not so straightforward. Later investigators attempted to show that a rational agent who believes he or she lives in an Everettian universe will make decisions as if the square amplitude measure gave chances for outcomes. This has given rise to much debate [4] , and the issue is not settled.
The preferred basis
Consider a two-state quantum system and an observable A with orthonormal eigenvectors |a 1 and |a 2 . A measurement of A will involve an apparatus in an initial state |α 0 which, upon interaction with the quantum system, will evolve to |α 1 or |α 2 , respectively, if the system is prepared in |a 1 or |a 2 .
If the quantum system's initial state is a superposition of |a 1 and |a 2 , the system and apparatus will evolve as
But the final state can also be written as
with |α The most popular answer is that the property of decoherence [5] , which is independent of any interpretational frame, favors well-defined macroscopic states.
Multiplicity
In Everett's framework, all results of a measurement occur. Here the question is, What does this statement mean from an ontological point of view? Everett was not entirely clear on how to answer this question, at least in his published work. His followers have developed three distinct types of answer:
1. Many worlds: The whole universe splits in different copies.
2. Many minds: Although apparatus and brain states superpose, consciousness is well-defined.
3. Reality is identified with patterns in the universal wave function.
Interpreting quantum mechanics
Everett's approach provides an interpretation of quantum mechanics. Of course, there are many others [6] . But what does it mean to interpret quantum mechanics? According to the semantic view of theories [7, 8] it consists in answering the question, How can the world be for quantum mechanics to be true? From this point of view, the problem of multiplicity is more pressing than the other two [9] . Indeed simply postulating the Born rule, as is usually done, will make probability well defined. And the preferred basis problem can also be solved by a specification, adequately guided by results from decoherence theory.
The extent of the ontological problem of multiplicity, gathered from the substantial literature on Everett's approach, has been analysed in [10] . The purpose of this paper is to see how the problem of multiplicity carries onto the ontological problem of spacetime.
Many worlds
As we pointed out above, Everett's views on multiplicity are not fully clarified in his published work. Probably the most straightforward way to understand multiplicity is to associate it with a literal split. That idea was popularized by DeWitt [11] :
This universe is constantly splitting into a stupendous number of branches, all resulting from the measurementlike interactions between its myriads of components. Moreover, every quantum transition taking place on every star, in every galaxy, in every remote corner of the universe is splitting our local world on earth into myriads of copies of itself.
This quote suggests that a split occurs everytime an interaction produces entanglement, whether or not macroscopic objects are involved. Everett, however, introduced multiplicity only in contexts where something like a macroscopic apparatus performs a measurement. Considerations will henceforth be restricted to such situations.
Healey [12] was the first to formalize the consequences of splitting on the nature of space. He first considered the possibility that systems split into n copies, in usual ordinary space. But then, so he argues, mass-energy would be multiplied by n and we would presumably be aware of the overcrowding of space. Accordingly, the split can become acceptable in two different ways:
1. The physical systems do not split, only their states do.
2. Not only systems, but space itself splits. The resulting systems may be viewed as living in a higher-dimensional manifold.
The first way anticipates multiplicity viewed as decoherent sectors of the wave function, which we will examine later. The second way is perhaps the easiest one to visualize. It involves multiple copies of spacetime, all of them multiplying further upon each measurement interaction. It does, however, raise a number of questions usually associated with state vector collapse: When, in the measurement process, does the split occur? Does the split occur on an equal-time hypersurface, or on a light cone (so as to be more consonant with special relativity)? What are the precise conditions that define a measurement? Related to splitting is the intriguing question of recombination. If evolution is unitary, measurements can in principle be undone. Just like worlds, multiple copies of spacetime should then recombine. This, however, can be avoided by means of bifurcation, an alternative to splitting introduced by Deutsch [13] . The idea is that there are infinitely many worlds (or spaces) at any time. Their number neither increases nor decreases. In measurement contexts the set of all spaces is partitioned in as many subsets as there are possible measurement results. In this case the multiplicity of the whole universe does not change, nor does the complete spacetime arena.
Many minds
Albert and Loewer [14] gave the first full-fledged formulation of the idea that the split involves the mind rather than the world. In the many-minds view, every observer has associated with it an infinite set of minds. Minds are associated with brain states but are not subject to superposition.
Many-minds approaches usually involve a single spacetime, in which different experiences coexist. But according to Lockwood [15] , the fact of a physical system's being in a superposition, with respect to some set of [consciousness] basis vectors, is to be un-derstood as the system's having a dimension in addition to those of time and space.
Just as one's mind is usually thought as being wholly present at different times when it has different experiences, it can also be thought, according to Lockwood, as wholly present in each different experiences it can have at a single time. These experiences can be viewed as lying on an axis orthogonal to the time axis. Spacetime is therefore enlarged, but by a dimensionality that is neither spatial nor temporal. Lockwood does not speculate on how the spacetime metric can connect to the additional dimension.
Patterns in the wave function
Decoherence theory is an important building block of an approach to Everett different from many worlds and many minds. It is mainly connected with the names of Gell-Mann and Hartle [16] , Saunders [17] and Wallace [18, 19] (although Gell-Mann and Hartle favor one world in the end).
Wallace [18] identifies real structures with stable patterns in the universal quantum state:
My claim is instead that the emergence of a classical world from quantum mechanics is to be understood in terms of the emergence from the theory of certain sorts of structures and patterns, and that this means that we have no need (as well as no hope!) of the precision which Kent and others here demand.
At the beginning of an experiment, there is one apparatus pattern in the universal quantum state. This, according to Wallace, means that there is one apparatus. At the end of the experiment, the universal quantum state, represented on the right-hand side of (1), contains two distinct apparatus patterns. Therefore there are now two apparatus. It doesn't make sense, according to Wallace, to ask questions about the apparatus in the very short decoherence timescale leading from one pattern to two patterns. Nor does the existence of two distinct patterns cause problems for, as one can see in Schrödinger's cat imagery:
If A and B are to be 'live cat' and 'dead cat' then [the relevant microscopic properties] P and Q will be described by statements about the state vector which (expressed in a position basis) will concern the wave-function's amplitude in vastly separated regions R P and R Q of configuration space, and there will be no contradiction between these statements.
So the live cat and the dead cat occupy different regions in configuration space. But how do they project in three-dimensional space? In classical theory, two different cats not only occupy different regions in configuration space, but also different regions in three-space. That is, their projections from configuration space to three-space do not overlap.
This, however, is not so with Wallace's patterns. Projected in three-space, the two cats may literally overlap. How can one understand this?
One possible answer is to assume that the live cat and the dead cat don't project from configuration space to the same three-space [20] . This means, for instance, that there is an added parameter, or another dimension, introduced to distinguish different three-spaces from each other.
This, however, is not the answer that Wallace prefers. According to him, there is only one three-space into which both patterns project. This implies that the live cat and the dead cat are, so to speak, ghostlike to each other. In the words of Allori et al. [21] , "[t]he two cats are [. . . ] reciprocally transparent." Do we have to choose between one three-space and many three-spaces? Investigating macroscopic ontology in Everettian quantum mechanics, Wilson [22] suggests that we may not:
[T]he 'spacetime' of the quantum mechanics and quantum field theory formalism, in terms of which branches are defined, is not the same as the 'spacetimes' of macroscopic worlds. The former 'spacetime' is a single entity common to multiple branches, while each of the latter 'spacetimes' is tied to a particular macroscopic course of events.
But Wilson also draws an analogy between bifurcation and consistent histories, each history being located in a distinct spacetime.
Discussion
We have shown elsewhere [10] that there is a wide spectrum of opinions, among adherents to Everett's approach, on the nature of Everettian multi-plicity. This, as we have just seen, translates into different views of space or spacetime, which fall into two broad categories:
1. Space (or spacetime) genuinely splits upon measurement of a quantum observable.
2. Space (and spacetime) don't split.
To some extent, this alternative occurs in all three main approaches to multiplicity, namely, many worlds, many minds and decoherent sectors of the wave function. If space genuinely splits, the problems traditionally connected with state vector collapse seem to be carried along the way. This does not mean that Everett's approach has to be rejected, but it invites Everettians to make their views substantially sharper.
If space doesn't split, we are confronted with various copies of macroscopic systems occupying the same spatial arena. The problem is, How can these systems not interact? In other words, How is the macroscopic multiplicity reconciled with the quantum field theory of interacting constituents? Wilson acknowledges the problem when he introduces two different notions of spacetime. The solution, however, remains to be implemented.
Conclusion
Interpreting quantum mechanics consists in answering the question, How can the world be for quantum mechanics to be true? Everett's approach is one possible answer to the question. Every answer currently considered has problems of its own. We conclude by pointing out three problems that are perhaps more specific to Everett's theory.
The first one is that it is not sharply defined. This has been documented here with respect to spacetime, and in [10] with respect to multiplicity. This contrasts with the de Broglie-Bohm approach which, at least in the nonrelativistic case, is rather well defined. Other interpretations do carry some measure of indefiniteness, for instance the Copenhagen distinction between the quantum and the classical. But the diversity of views among Everett's adherents is particularly striking.
The second one can be considered either a problem or a strength, depending on one's point of view. It consists in the fact that Everett's approach is highly dependent on the exact validity of quantum mechanics. Everett's many worlds, so it seems, won't survive the smallest nonlinear term to the Schrödinger equation. By contrast, again, the de Broglie-Bohm approach is highly adaptable to changes in the formalism of quantum mechanics [23] .
The third problem has to do with Everett's extraordinary ontology. True, science has taught us that common sense is not always the best of guides. Yet, as in experimental investigations, "Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence." Many critics of Everett's approach believe that such evidence has not convincingly been put forward by Everett's supporters.
